CLASS COALITIONS AND POLITICAL PACTS

2008. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution was the outcome of a democratic and popular political pact. (Article: Folha de S.Paulo).

2008. The Public Bureaucracy in the Construction of Brazil (in Portuguese) To be published this book should be actualized with the 1995 Managerial Reform and its implementation. I should find a co-author to do that. (Book available in my website in PDF).

2008. With Eli Diniz. Brazilian industrial entrepreneurs associated with the state bureaucracy were dominant from 1930 to late 1980s. Now, they may be returning to power. At least they are better prepared for that. (Paper to be published)

2009. An encompassing analysis of the Brazilian macroeconomic system; a first attempt to build new-developmental macroeconomics. (This book is an atualized version of Macroeconomia da Estagnação). Available in bookstores

2007. An encompassing analysis of the Brazilian macroeconomic system. A first presentation of the developmental macroeconomics. Why Brazil failed to grow fast after the Real Plan. (Book: Editora 34) Out of print; availble in this site. English version available: Developing Brazil (2009).

2007. The Brazilian public bureaucracy as well as the industrial bourgeoisie are out of the dominant political coalition since late 1980s. Yet, as it is engaged in the 1995 Managerial Reform, it is committed with a project.(Paper Revista do Serviço Público). French version available.

2002. The Lula administration probably means the rise of third popular political pact in Brazil since 1930. Vargas "national developmentalism"
between 1930 and 1959 and the "Diretas Já" pact between 1977 and 1986 were
the other two popular political coalitions. (Article: Folha de S.Paulo).

1998. With Yoshiaki Nakano. It is misleading to attribute economic difficulties to politicians and bureaucrats, since incompetent and self-interest policies decided by economists are also responsible. This is more so when the country misses an effective social contract. English version available. (Paper in Estado e Sociedade). This is an improved version of "A origem política dos problemas econômicos" (1995).

1998. With Yoshiaki Nakano. It is misleading to attribute economic difficulties to politicians and bureaucrats, since incompetent and self-interest policies decided by economists are also responsible. This is more so when the country misses an effective social contract. Portuguese version available. (Paper in edited book by Ducatenzeiler and Oxhorn)

1993. A new political pact of the Brazilian elites around the idea of national development is a condition for political legitimacy and economic growth. Portuguese and English versions available.(Paper: Problèmes d Amérique Latine)*

1993. Given its extreme social heterogeneity and the 'contradictory citizenship', there is not a social contract in Brazil. In the recent past, informal growth oriented political pacts replaced a social contracts. The solution for the present crisis depends on the definition of a not growth oriented political pact. French and English versions available.(Paper in book edited by Sola e Paulani).

1989. The transition to democracy was an outcome of successful political popular-business pact, but mistaken ideologies originated in old left populism, and on conservative clientelism (pork barrel), opportunism, social conservatism, monetarism, crude liberalism, and subordinated internationalism represent an obstacle to democratic consolidation and growth in Brazil. (Paper: Estudos Avançados). English version available.

1985 {1986}. The Entrepreneurial or Producer State was essential to Latin Americas primitive accumulation and industrialization. Now, in the new stage that the more advanced Latin American countries are entering, it is time for the the Regulatory and the Social State. Yet, this transition is taking place together with the transition to democracy, a major debt crisis, and a neo-liberal ideological ofensive. Portuguese version available. (Paper: in book edited by Atilio Boron)*

1985. The transition from the Entrepreneurial to the Regulatory State in Latin America is taking place in the middle of a financial (debt) crisis, the advancement of neo-liberal ideology, and the transition to democracy, after the state completed its role of promoting primitive accumulation. Spanish version available. (Paper in book edited by Atilio Boron Portuguese version just published here)

1985 (1988). With the transiction to democracy and the election of Tancredo Neves the probability of a populist political pact is small. The alternatives after democratization are a conservative pact based on the great bourgeoisie, or a progressive one based on the middle classes.Portuguese version available. (Paper in book edited by Chacel, Falk e Fleischer)

1985. With the transiction to democracy and the election of Tancredo Neves the probability of a populist political pact is small. The alternatives after democratization are a conservative pact based on the great bourgeoisie, or a progressive one based on the middle classes. English version available. (Paper in the book Pactos Políticos)

1985. Collected papers on political pacts and the 1987-85 Brazilian transition to democracy. Complements the analysis originally made in O Colapso de uma Aliança de Classes. (Book: Editora Brasiliense). Sold out. Available in PDF.

1984. The 'abertura' is a strategy that military are using to postpone the democratic transition that became inevitable since the Brazilian business men broke down their alliance with them.(Paper in Development and Crisis in Brazil: 1930-1983.)

1983. A 'abertura' is a strategy through which the military try to procrastinate the democratization demanded by civil society. (Paper: Revista de Administração de Empresas)

1978. The beginning of the transition to democracy in Brazil: the Brazilian bourgeoisie reacts to the authoritarian "Pacote de Abril" of 1977 breaking down its 1964 alliance with the military. Esgotado nas livrarias. Complete book in PDF format in this site e na apple store